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IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF UTAH 
"1 FARM PRODUCTION CREDIT 
·, 0 ,0C Ll\ T TON, 
0'3intiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
'HLO w. WATTS, et. al., 
Defendant and Respondents. 
case No. lnao 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This action was commenced by Utah Farm Production 
:redit Association (hereinafter "PCA"), to seek payment of three 
promissory notes and to foreclose a mortgage securing the repay-
~ent of said notes against Milo W. Wat ts and Cleown W. watts 
(hereinafter "Watts") and Buford L. Gregory and Elizabeth A. 
Gregory ( hereinafter "Gregory") • In addition, PCA sought pay-
~Ent of an unsecured note which was the obligation of Gregory 
Watts brought a cross-claim against Gregory under the 
Provisions of a Uniform Real Estate Contract on a farm of 
;~proximately 480 acres in size (hereinafter designated as the 
··;·;;gory Farm") . The Gregory Farm was originally owned by Watts 
ic"I purchased by Gregory from Watts. Prior to the sale of the 
' 0 qory Farm to Gregory, PCA had a secured position on the 
0 gory Farm, watts' home and ranch (hereinafter "Home/Farm"), 
crops and equipment to secure an obligation due from Watr. 3 tv 
PCA. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The complaint was filed in April 1980, and the case''" 
at issue in June 1980. PCA sought summary judgment in August 
1980 which was denied on December 16, 1980. Discovery was con· 
ducted by all parties. 
PCA filed a second motion for summary judgment i~ 
October 1981. Partial summary judgment was granted October 2n, 
1981 in favor of PCA with the only issues remaining as to the 
exact amount owing to PCA because of farming operations froo t~ 
year 1980 and whether the Home/Farm is subject to the mortgage, 
Additional discovery was conducted by the parties. 
On December 7, 1981 PCA again sought summary judgment 
on the only remaining issues and on December 4, 1981 Watts 
sought summary judgment against PCA. Oral argument was held 
December 15, 1981 before Judge Burns, and the court took both 
motions under advisement with additional memoranda to be filed 
by the moving parties. 
Memoranda were subsequently filed by the moving parlle' 
the last of which was filed February 1, 19820 Additional dis 
covery and affidavits was completed and filed with the court 
June 1982. The trial court did not rule on the pendinq mo' 1 
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cied PCA's motion for summary judgment and granted summary 
, ,J•imen ~ in f avot:' of Wat ts, both as to PCA and against Gregory 
,Ile <'ross-claim. 
The summa:y judgment was docketed with the clerk of the 
;oJrt on July 28, 1983. On August 11, 1983, PCA filed its 
~lot ice of Appeal. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
PCA seeks a reversal of the summary judgment in favor 
o~ Watts, and for judgment against Watts in the amount of 
5346, 346. 72 plus interest from and after December 15, 1981, 
~gether with a decree of foreclosure against the Gregory Farm, 
the Home/Farm, crops and equipment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Watts had been borrowers from PCA for a number of years 
erior to 1978. Watts sold to Gregory a farm of approximately 
180 acres in size (R. 50). At the time of this sale, Watts were 
111debted to PCA in the amount of $104, 884. 00 secured by a mort-
1age on the 480 acre Gregory Farm, a mortage on the Home/Farm, 
•'roµs, c:attle and equipment (R. 385). 
-3-
After the sale of the Gregory Farm to Gregory, Wac•, 
and Gregory sought additional financing from PCA (R. 386-1Ri 
PCA had no experience with Gregory, but had a number -if /aa, 
experience with Watts and approved a loan to Watts-Greg-:i• 1 ~ 
January 6, 1980 (R. 15, 386, 3871 part oE which was~ "c,111 
of Watts' $104,804.00 loan in the amount of $105,319.00 (R,J;: 
Watts was the primary obliger on said note (R. 15, 311, 159-i 
367-69, 379), and it was the property of Watts, with the poss'' 
exception of the equitable interest of Gregory in the Gregor/ 
Farm, that was the security for the loan of January 8, 137q 
(R.15, 18-21, 23-30). 
On March 21, 1979 PCA made an additional loan to Watts 
Gregory in the amount of $20,000.00 (R. 16, 385-86). This 
additional loan was secured by the Watts properties (R. lA, 
18-21, 23-30). On August 21, 1979 PCA loaned to Watts-Gregor', 
the sum of $48,890.00 (R.17), again secured by all of Watts' 
property. 
On June 1, 1979 PCA made a loan to Gregory onlJ i~ t1e 
amount of $38,890.00 (R.22), which was an usecured loan. 
Default on all four notes occurred and PCA commenced 
this action to enforce payment on April 30, 1980 and to fore-
close on the security given to insure payment of said notes " 
1). 
PCA, after the matter was at issue, sought summ~r' 
judgment on August 22, 1980 (R. 75). There were accomp~n1' 
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'!i 1avi ts and memorandum submitted in August 1980 in support of 
,·;"s m0tion (R. 75-100). Dudng the crop year of 1980, PCA 
o' o,1 1 nto an cigreement with Watts to farm the property under 
odOSlJ(P (R. 88-9?., 117-119). Watts filed an opposing 
iavit which put into issue the amount realized from the 
oera:ion of the Gregory Farm for the crop year of 1980. (R • 
.. 7-Ll9). '!'he summary judgment motion was jenied on December 
l9~0 (R. 129). 
Additional discovery was completed and a second motion 
'x su!Tll11ary judgment was filed on behalf of PCA (R 231-232), 
:Jgecher with accompanying memorandum and affidavits (R. ?.33-
:J?I. On October 20, 1981 the trial court granted PCA's motion 
''lr partial summary judgment leaving only the issues of how much 
~s due and owing on the Notes, and whether the Home/Farm was 
J3:c of the security (R. 251, 332-333). 
On July 17, 1981, PCA enterd into a release agreement 
.,,__~ Gregory for the satisfaction of the Gregory Note (Exhibit E 
:,, the complaint, R. 22), and to release Gregory from any defi-
:tency judgment on the foreclosure of the Gregory Farm, while 
:, eserving the right of PCA to either take a deed in lieu of 
'.zeclosure of Gregory's interest in and to the Gregory Farm, or 
~n•inue the foreclosure proceeding and have a stipulated judg-
,·.nt 0f f()reclosure on the interests of Gregorys (R. 268-85), 
i f•Jreclosure of the Home/Farm. 
PCA conducted further discovery on the remaining issues 
• a:iain sought summary judgment on December 7, 1981 (R. 258) 
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together with accompanying affidavits and memorandum (R, '6;' 
291, 311-333, 358-395). Watts moved for a summary judgrne~: 
256-257) on December 4, 1981 as against PCA and as against 
Gregory on May 20, 1983 (R. 398-399). The court after he3ti,10 
oral argument on December 15, 1981 on PCA's and Watt's respec 
tive summary judgment motions, tool<: the matter under adv1se'lle~'. 
(R. 298), and requested supplemental memorada by both parties. 
PCA and Watts both filed supplemental memoranda the 
last being filed February l, 1982 (R. 346). The trial court 
received additional evidence by way of deposition (Mr. Boyer' 
and affidavits, the last of which were filed with the court on 
July 28, 1982 (R. 378), 
The trial court finally agreed to rule on the pending 
motions on June 7, 1983 (R. 396). On June 7, 1983 the trial 
court made a record of the proceedings and asked to be 
"refreshed" on the respective positions on Watts' motion for 
sullUllary judgment (Supp. R. 3). After argument, the trial cour' 
made a finding that no justiciable issue of fact and law exist; 
to the stat us of Wat ts and found that Wat ts were "accommodation 
makers" on the notes (Supp. R. 4). Further, the court found t~e 
release of July 17, 1983, released 
. . Watts to the same extent that the release 
refers to Gregory's, which the court interprets as 
a matter of law, to release the property as to 
claims against Gregorys same applicable to defen-
dant Watts. (Supp. R. 4). 
The court denied PCA's summary judgment on the basis 
a "justiciable issue of fact" and further granted watts' motiJ' 




THERE ARE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT ON WATTS' MOTION 
The purpose of summary judgment procedure is to deter-
]i"e whether there are any triable issues of fact requiring a 
formal trial on the merits. Rule 56 ( c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires a showing that there is no genuine 
issues as to any material fact and that the movi!lg party is 
~ntitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is a well esta-
~lished general principle that a genuine issue of material fact 
is necessary in order to preclude a summary judgment. A "genuine" 
issue is one which can be maintained by substantial evidence. In 
7J Arn. Jur. 2d Summary Judgment §22 at pages 743-44 the law is 
stated: 
The mere presence of an alleged adverse claim is 
not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment, but to defeat summary judgment a party 
must substantiate his contradictory version in 
evidentiary form. It is not enough that one 
opposing a motion for summary judgment claims that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact; some 
evidence showing the existence of such an issue 
must be presented in the counteraffidavits. In 
other words, in order to show a triable issue of 
fact so as to defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment, mere general averments will not suffice, 
since an evidentiary showing is indispensible. 
(emphasis supplied) 
In accordance with the foregoing, PCA filed several 
'tfidavits in opposition to Watts' Motion for Summary Judgment 
3upported by many evidentiary exbibits showing the existence of a 
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genuine issue of fact. Specifically, there is an issue of tac" 
whether Watts are "accommodation makers" as found by the tr 1 , 
court {Supp. R. 4). An accommodation maker is defined in 
§?OA-3-415 as follows: 
An accommodation party is one who signs t:1e 
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of 
lending his name to another party to it. 
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. 2, p. 10002-3 §3-415:? 
states in part: 
The intention of the parties is the signifi-
cant element in determining whether a given party 
is an accommodation party and the identity of the 
party accommodated. If the intent is not 
expressed, the purpose for which the commercial 
paper is executed or used is the significant 
element. . . . Where a person receives no direct 
benefit from the execution of the paper, it is 
likely that he will be regarded as an accommo-
dation party but not if he receives a benefit. 
Illustrative of this distinction, it has been held 
that where a co-signer of a note receives a bene-
1!.! from the proceeds of the note such person is , 
co-maker and not an accommodation party. {emphasis 
supplied) 
The intent of PCA and Watts-Gregory is expressed in the 
loan documents, the promissory notes and the security documents 
Watts are co-makers, The intent of PCA is very well estahlisr~,j 
by the affidavits of Wood, Naylor and Mills wherein they stated 
10. That the security which PCA was given 
pursuant to the attachments to the Verified Com-
plaint was on property that was owned in the main 
by Defendants Milo w. Watts and his wife Cleown W, 
Watts, and that affiant, in his capacity as a 
member of the loan committee with the specific 
responsibility to approve or disapprove loan 
applications, deemd Defendants Milo w. Watts and 
Cleown W. Watts, Buford L. Gregory and Elizabeth 
A. Gregory, his wife, as joint co-makers on said 
Note and obligation and that said loans per the 
Verified Complaint were on the auspices and 
strength of Milo w. Watts, Cleown w. Watts, Buford 
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L. Gregory and Elizabeth A. Gregory jointly as 
co-ma~ers in each and every instance, and that the 
3ffiant so acted in his capacity as President of 
PCA and as a member of the loan committee on all 
loan applications as per the Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto, w1ich loan action refers to Gerald Naylor 
and affiant herein and Ferris J. Fitzgerald. (R. 
359-60, Mills Affidavit) 
3. Said loan was the result of a "roll over" 
of $105,519.00 of Milo and Cleown Watts' prior 
obligation and the extension of an additional 
amount of $93,000.00 per an operating budget 
submitted by Gregory-Watts. 
4. Affiant, of his own knowledge, declares 
and states that PCA, through its officers and 
agents, considered this loan to be the loan 
primarily of Milo and Cleown Watts inasmuch as 
there was long history established with Mr. and 
Mrs. Watts and the total security was owned by Mr. 
and Mrs. Watts and that Gregorys were unknown to 
PCA and had not established credit with PCA. (R. 
311, Wood Affidavit). 
4. That affiant, of his own knowledge, 
declares and states that in his capacity as Branch 
Manager as well as a member of the loan committee 
which approved the various loans which are evi-
denced by Exhibits "A", "B" and "C" to Plaintiff's 
Verified Complaint. 
5. That affiant, of his own knowledge, 
declares and states that it was discussed on many 
occasions that the security for the Notes, Exhi-
bits "A", "B" and "C", was a mortgage on certain 
real property, which real property was, in fact, 
owned by Defendants Milo Watts and his wife, that 
said loans would not have been made without said 
security and as Milo W. Watts and his wife as 
co-makers as distinguished from a guarantor or an 
accommodation maker. 
7. That affiant, of his own knowledge, 
declares and states that Utah Farm Production 
Credit Association has a special form for a 
guarantor and/or accommodation maker and that said 
form is hereto attached as Exhibit "B" and by this 
reference is incorporate into and made a part of 
this Affidavit as if fully set out herein, and 
that Defendants Milo Watts and his wife Cleown 
-9-
Watts has never been asked to execute as guaran-
tors as distinguished from co-makers on t~ese 
obligations. (R. 378-79, "laylor Affidavit). 
Finally, Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, sup'a, 
the 1970-74 supplement states at p. 901 §3-415:9 to tl1e •Jr1j 
text: 
When the evidence is conflicting as to whether a 
person signed commercial paper as an accommodation 
for the payee, a question of fact is presented 
which is to be determined by the trier of fact, 
Watts asserts and argued before the trial court that 
whoever received the proceeds of the loan is a "principal 
obliger" (R, 291). It is submitted that this a secondary test 
and not the primary test. The primary test is the intent of ---
parties. 
The intent of the parties is evidenced by t11e loan ac: 
documents, the affidavits and the notes. In August, 1978, Wa''-' 
sold to Gregory 481 acres. Gregorys were new to the Kanosh 1,,-
and were unknown as far as farming operations, and as to cr~di: 
worthiness. PCA, in July 1978 (see loan action document U, q 
368-9) made ~, not Gregory, a loan. The last notation stat'· 
Recommend approval based on long time experience 
with member, repayment by maturity, security and 
financial strength. (emphasis supplied) 
The loan of $104,884.00 is one to watts. It is essential tn nc'' 
what security is given for the watts' loan. On document U, '' 
security is spelled out as: 
Crop liquidation 
1st mortgage 109 acres (Watts' home) 
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Cattle on hand 
Cattle on contracts 
Equipment 
2nd mortgage on 1257 acres (Watts' farm) 
rn January, 1979, there is a request for an additional 
,1 n anri to "roll :>ver" the Watts' loan of $104,000.00 from 
-,-3 Document #2 (R. 366-7) is an action report showing that 
:',e :oan was to "Gregory - Watts" and the correspondence of 
11nJary 8, 1979 discloses that $101,073. 72, plus interest of 
Sl.44'>.~8. is from the "roll over" of the Watts' loan of 1978. 
On document #2, there is a description of the security 
·~r th is loan as follows: 
Hay 
1st mortgage on 109 acres (Watts' home) 
Cattle on contract receivable 
Equipment 
2nd mortgage on 1257 acres (Watts' farm) 
::.,en a casual observation discloses this to be the very same 
iecurity as the Watts' loan of 1978. 
The note signed by both Watts and Gregory in the 
:apacity of "makers" appears as Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's 
Complaint having a face amount of $198,519.00. It is noted that 
\1atts' names appear first and Gregory's as second. Mr. Richard 
~arl, a loan officer for PCA, has stated under oath that on 
:ienalf of PCA in the capacity of a loan officer he considered 
'·l1t~s 'Is the primary makers and that the loan was secured totally 
'""" "<atts' property. 
A second increase of the loan was made to "Gregory -
,'1tts" with a note dated March 27, 1979. See Exhibit "B" attached 
: 1 Plaintiff's Complaint. This loan action was documented on 
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document 115 (R. 364-5). It is an increase of the ear 1 ior 
see bottom of the first page of document #5 and again the 10,,; 
"Additional Loan Action." The security for this increasP 
Hay 
1st mortgage on 109 acres (Watts' home) 
Cattle on contract receivable 
Equipment 
2nd mortgage on 1257 acres (''1atts' farm) 
It is noted in the concluding paragraph: 
Recommend approval of this loan increase request 
based on members' financial strength, repayment 
capacity, and security position. (emphasis 
supplied). 
It is obvious that this is only an increase not a ne« 
loan. It is based upon members' (plural) financial strength anc 
upon the security position. All of the security is from Milo 
Watts. Watts' names appear first on the note (Exhibit "B"\. 
The last note (Exhibit "C" to Plaintiff's Compiaint'I '"' 
executed by Watts and Gregory and the "Additional Loan Action,· 
document ll7 (R. 362-3) indicates the following: 
A. This is an increase of existing loan for 
operating expenses. 
B. It is approved with a notation that there is 
to be "No more increases until Arizona 
property sold." 
C. This increase is $48,890.00 and makes the 
total $314,863.00. 
D. The security is: 
Hay 
1st mortgage on 109 acres (Watts' homei 
Cattle on contract receivable 
Equipment 
2nd mortgage on 1257 acres (Watts' farm) 
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Pc··,mes verv obvious tl-iat the last increase, Exhibit "C" signed 
j•tts Eirst and Gregory second, is the original Watts' loan 
watts has never just "lent" his credit to Gregory as far 
,5 PC~. is concerned, but was the maker, the member, the owner of 
:e security and was the sole borrower initially of which the 
:::'.amount is now and has been outstanding. The documents all 
.~icate watts was really the primary borrower. 
Even under the secondary test, Watts is a co-maker and 
orimary obliger. Watts obviously received direct benefit of 
;_85,Sl9.00 (R. 311) on Note "A", the other two notes are exten-
:1~ns of the original loan. If Watts received "benefits" from 
·~e notes, they are not accommodation makers. See Fisher v. The 
0 '.c~ Growers Bank, 122 Ark. 602, 184 S.W. 36, MacArthur v. 
~rnnon, 4 Conn. Cir. 208, 229 A.2d 372 (1967), Hansen v. Cheek 
and Devant, 251 Ark. 897, 475 S.W.2d 526 (1972). Also, 90 
;,~.~.3d 243 and Nelson v. Cotham, 595 S.W.2d 693 (Ark. App. 
l980), wherein the Court stated: 
While PFS did insist that Mr. Cotham personally 
sign the Note before credit would be extended to 
the Corporation, this record shows that Cotham's 
purpose in signing the Note was not solely to lend 
riis name as a surety to the other comakers. We 
are persuaded that his primary purpose in signing 
the Note was to benefit his business interests by 
obtaining money to keep his corporation going with 
the expectation that it would ultimately repay the 
Note. Therefore he was not an accommodation 
endorser under the circumstances. 
~tls personally wanted Gregory to operate the 481 acre farm to 
~able to pay Watts for said farm. The first note signed by 
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both Watts-Gregory ($198,519.00) consisted of $10~,000.rJo ·~ 
over, and an operating loan to farm the Gregory Farm. The-. 
note ($20,000.00) was to make permanent improvement t•) th" 
Gregory Far'll. Watts received a payment from ~.he pror"e>ds 
last L1crease of some $27, 000. 00. Watts cannot '.)e cFI dCr•irn. 11 , 
tion maker under these circumstances. 
POINT I I 
IF WATTS IS A CO-MAKER AND NOT AN ACCOMMOOA'I'ION MAKER, 
'I'HE RELEASE HAS NO EFFECT 
It is conceded by all parties that the only basis of 
relief for Watts is if Watts is an accommodation maker as oppc; 0 
to a party of primary obligation. There exi.sts, at the outs~· 
material issue of fact of what the status of Watts is in this 
instance. If Watts is a primary obligor then the trial C•Jurt 
erred in its "Findings" and ruling. 
This issue is crucial to Watts' position. In the lea•i 
case of Woh lhuter v. St. Charles Lumber and Fuel Co. , 3 38 N. E. · 
179, 62 Ill.2d 16 (1975), the Court concluded at page 182: 
In our opinion the legislative history of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and its predecessor, the 
Negotiable Instrument Law, supports the concl~sion 
that the term "any party" as used in section 3-~06 
of the Uniform Commercial Code was intended to 
include parties who sign negotiable instrume11ts 
ostensibly as makers but who are in fact suretJes 
or accommodation makers, and that the provisi. 0 ns 
of section 3-506 (1) (b) do not appl\' to co-makers ,. 
-14-
I ...._ 
See also Peoples Bank, Etc. v. Pied Piper Retreat, Inc., 
. 19 ~. E: "d 572 (W. V;i. 1974), wherein the Court declared at page 
The appellant concedes that this defense of unjus-
tifiable impairment of collateral is available 
only to secondary or accommodation parties. This 
is undoubtedly the rule--the defense is available 
to both secondary parties and accommodation 
parties, whether the latter are secondary accommo-
dation parties such as accommodation endorsers, or 
primary accommodation parties such as accommoda-
tion makers. The defense is not available to 
principal debtors, i.e., makers. See the official 
comment to Code, 46-3-606, where it is indicated 
that this is a suretyship defense available to a 
party who has recourse against another party to 
the instrument. See also I, Hawkland, A Trans-
actional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Section 2.1705, page 551, Section 2.2101, page 
563; Oregon Bank v. Baardson, 256 Or. 454, 473 
P.2d 1015. 
;,1so see Hooper v. Ryan, 581 S.W.2d 237 (Texas 1979), where it is 
,1eld that Section 3. 606 of the UCC applies to sureties and not to 
~a-makers. 
This court has acknowledged the distinction between 
~a-makers and accommodation makers and the effect under the UCC. 
See Kennedy v. Bank of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881 (1979 Utah). 
watts cannot be an accommodation maker on his own 
0hligation. The Missouri court in Kooff v. Miller, 501 s.w. 2d 
i'2 '.Miss. 1973) states at page 537: 
It is also true, however, that "No one can be an 
accommodation maker of a note given for his own 
debt" (Citation omitted) 
Finally the case of Bell v. Citizens & Southern Nat. 
• 0~, 151 Ga. App. 126, 2585 F.2d 774 (1979) is on all fours with 
·., situation. Mrs. Bell, the wife of a husband who had filed 
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bankruptcy asserted she was an accommodation makc>r, whil~ 
admitting: 
A. The note showed her as a maker; 
B. The note was a refinancing or renewal of at'Pr 
for which she was liable; 
C. Her husband obtained additional funds used in 
husband's business; 
O. The proceeds were used to pay off joint income t;_, 
liability; 
E. A draw of some of the money was received in •ho 
household account. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court held her as a co-maker an~ 
not an accommodation maker. Watts, in this instance did the 
following' 
A Watts signed the notes as makers; 
B. The notes were a renewal or refinancing af an 
obligation of $105, 000. 00 of Watts' personal ab~iqat 
C. Gregory received operating funds to farm the Gres: 
Farm to produce income from which to purchase the r,:·' 
gory Farm from Watts; 
D. The loan proceeds were used in part to pay 0[f i'--
obligations of Watts-Gregory. 
E. The proceeds of the loan were used to pay Watfe 
payment of some $27,000.00 on the contract of rur 
between Watts and Gregory. 
Watts must be a co-maker as opposed to an accommodation makor 




-w ~'!irlence is clear to make Watts a primary obligor or maker. 
_,- -~r, Lf the evidence in the form of affidavits and docu-
includi~g the notes themselves, is unclear, it certainly 
, 13 es ~n issue of material fact that must be determined by the 
_tel -Jf fact. Therefore, the trial court's decision for summary 
- idgment in favor of Watts must be reversed. 
POINT III 
PCA SPECIFICALLY RESERVED ITS RIGHTS AGAINST WATTS 
PCA asserts that a careful reading of the Settlement 
~reement in the context of its execution discloses an express 
ceservation as against Watts on PCA's foreclosure action. In the 
'recitals" portion of the Settlement Agreement, it states: 
A. Gregorys together with Milo and Cleown Watts 
(collectively "Watts") are indebted to PCA on 
three (3) promissory notes executed by Gregorys 
and Watts in favor of PCA dated January 8, 1979, 
March 21, 1979 and August 21, 1979 (collectively 
the "Gregory/Watts Notes"). Additionally, Gre-
gorys are indebted to PCA on a separate note dated 
June 1, 1979 (the "Gregory Note"). All of said 
notes are in default and litigation concerning the 
notes has been commenced by PCA against Gregorys 
and Watts in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Millard County, State of Utah, in Civil No. 7137, 
Utah Farm Production Credit Association, plain-
tiff, against Milo W. Watts, et al. (the 
"Lawsuit") . 
B. To secure repayment of the Gregory/Watts 
Notes, Watts have previously given PCA a certain 
mortgage (the "Mortgage") over real property 
located in Millard County, State of Utah. Said 
Mortgage covers a four hundred eighty-one (481) 
acre piece of property (the "Gregory Farm") and 
other oroperties owned by Watts including his home 
(colle~tively the "Home Farm"). The Lawsuit has 
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been instituted to collect the notes and to 
foreclose the Mortgage and for other relief. 
Then in paragraph E of the recitals, after the ; 0 ,,,, 
or litigation has been defined, the Agreement provide~· 
Eo Gregorys and PCA desire to settle the diF 
ferences among them and to resolve the Lawsuit 
insofar as it affects their interrelationsh1ps and 
to work together to conclude the litigation 
between them and the Watts. 
The Agreement then provides for the Release of G(~· 
in paragraph 6. It should be noted this is not a release of 
Watts, Paragraph 6 states: 
6. Release of Gregorys. From and after the 
execution hereof and the execution and delivery of 
the documents and cash described in paragraphs 1 
through 5, PCA will and does hereby release and 
discharge Gregorys and each of them from any and 
all liability which they may have to PCA under th~ 
Gregory/Watts Notes, under the Gregory Note, under 
the Mortgage, under any security agreements, under 
the Assignment of Equity and under any other 
documents of security given to PCA by Gregor ys, or 
either of them, to secure their indebtedness to 
PCA under the Gregory/Watts Notes and the Gregory 
Note, provided, however, this release shall not 
constitute a release of any obligations of Gre-
gorys to PCA under the documents and covenants qet 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 5 hereof, From and 
after execution hereof, PCA's sole remedy for 
recovery of the sums due it from Gregorys under 
the Gre or Watts Notes shall be throu h fore-
closure sale of the Gre or Farm and or the Home 
Farm an PCA s sole remedy for recovery for the 
sums due it from the Gregorys under the Gregory 
Note shall and under those documents and covenants 
set forth in paragraphs 1 through 5 hereof, 
(emphasis supplied) 
Paragraph 8 provides: 
8. Stipulation in Lawsuit. Upon exc>cution 
hereof, PCA and Gregorys will enter into a st1?u 
lation to be filed in the Lawsuit in the form 
attached hereto as Exhibit "E"o 
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Jf the Exhibits is Exhibit E, which provides in paragraphs 2 
2. PCA may have judgment of foreclosure of 
any right, title and interest of Gregorys in and 
to any of the real property which is the subject 
of this action entered at any time without further 
notice to Gregorys. 
3. In return for the conveyance described 
above the promises and covenants of Gregorys in 
the Settlement Agreement, PCA forever releases and 
discharges Gregorys from liability for payment of 
the sums due under the promissory notes attached 
to the verified complaint herein as Exhibits A, B, 
C and E and from any claims for any deficiency 
which may arise after foreclosure of any of the 
real property which is the subject of this action. 
Judgment of foreclosure is granted against Gregorys on 
l.!!Y of the real property. If foreclosure was not going forward 
~ainst Watts as provided in paragraph "E", then this stipulation 
,ould have no meaning. PCA would have simply dismissed the 
Yet PCA expressly reserved the right with Gregorys to " 
conclude (not dismiss) the litigation ••• " and PCA's " 
~le remedy for recovery of the sums due it from Gregorys under 
':he Gregory/Wat ts Notes shall be through foreclosure sale of the 
,,regory Farm and/or the Home Farm •.. •. This reservation of a 
f:ireclosure sale, which can only come about by concluding the 
~litigation, is an express reservation. 
PCA has actively pursued, since the date of the Settle-
~greement, the foreclosure action. In the treatise of 
o-,,.J~rs, Willier & Hart, Vol. 13, p.71, §13.26, under reservation 
'C '1ghts it states: 
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Nothing in Section 3-606 requires that the reset 
vation be in writing. 
The reservation must occur before or at the ti~c 
the holder takes the action ()(Tai_ ls to ta~e t'"'" 
action. 
1'CA, befo:e the Settlement Agreement, "reser·Jed' 
rights against Watts by the filing of this very action. 
not dismiss this action. This action is an express reser 'l~ .. 
of rights as against Defendant Watts. 
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. ~. p. 111, 
§3-601:11 states: 
The Code declares the effect but does not regulciro 
the form or content of a reserv3tion of rights. 
Any agreement or declaration which manifests the 
intention to reserve rights should therefore be 
deemed sufficient. When it is claimed that there 
has been a reservation of rights against an accom-
modation party, such reservation may be shmm by a 
letter written by the holder to the accommodate~ 
party and other circumstances of the transaction. 
The circumstances of this transaction show that PCA 1°"' 
intended to dismiss its lawsuit but to conclude the forecl(),'3J.:'. 
The very act of retaining the lawsuit is an express reserva::,. 
Mr. Schofield filed an affidavit found at pages 26) ci 
of the record disclosing an express reservation by the follo·n' 
That affiant, of his own knowledge, declares and 
states that it was expressly understood between 
all parties to the stipulation that Plaintiff in 
this matter would proceed as against Defendant 
Watts, and each of them, to effectuate collect10n 
of the obligation due to PCA and that the 
settlement entered into between the parties was 
settlement of an unsecured portion of an 
obligation that was due from Gregorys only and th~ 
foreclosure of the 481 acre interest of Grego•/ 1 " 
said property and that the foreclosure would 
continue as it relates to Watts' interest, if any, 
in the 481 acres, together with additional l~nc1 as 
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given as security for the three pormissory notes 
( R. 266) 
The deposition of Mr. Clark and Mr. Christensen, counsel 
,gory confirm this reservation by the following language: 
Q. [by Mr. Brown] And at that time did you make 
a statement, as near as I can quote you, that if 
~r. Gregory would be called on the witness stand 
and that if you and Mr. Christensen were to be 
called on the witness stand that you would have to 
testify it was everyone's understanding that PCA 
wo11ln go forward against Watts? 
A. [Mr. Clark] As nearly as I can recall, 
subject to the objection that I have made and 
subject to any prefatory statement as I was 
speaking to you, is that if it survived an objec-
tion I told you that we assumed that PCA would 
continue with its foreclosure action with respect 
to the farm. (p. 6 of Clark Deposition) 
··- rhristensen testified: 
Q. Did you ever have any discussions with Mr. 
Schofield prior to or simultaneously with or about 
the time of the execution of the settlement agree-
ment about whether or not PCA would continue its 
litigation as against Watts? 
A. We may have had some discussions. I don't 
recall specifically the discussions in that 
regard. My recollection is that PCA would pursue 
against the land. 
Q. And the foreclosure would have to proceed as 
against whatever interest Watts had in that? 
THE WITNESS: Again, my understanding was PCA would 
pursue against the land and anybody claiming an 
interest in the land. I would assume that would 
1nclude the Watts. 
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Q. And do you recall Mr. Clark making a statemPric 
to the following tenure where he said that if hP 
Mr. Clark, and Mr. Christensen and Dr. Gregory -· 
were to be called as witnesses on the witness :Hand 
they would have to testify that it was everyone•, 
understanding that PCA would go forward against 
watts? 
THE WITNESS: He made a statement regarding going 
against the property. To the best of my recollec 
tion, that was not the precise language used by 
Mr. Clark, rather it was b21sically that if we werP 
called as witnesses we would have to testify that 
we assumed PCA woulrl go against the property arid 
all those claiming an interest in the property. 
Again, that is not exact, but that was my impres-
sion of what he intended to say, the substance of 
what he communicated to the two of you at that 
conference. He said that they would go against 
the property and anybody claiming an interest in 
the property. (p 5-7 Christensen deposition) 
The reasoning behind §70A-3-606, Utah Code Annotaterl, 
1953 as amended, is to preserve to an accommodation maker or 
:ourety the right of subrogation and/or contribution. In fac:, 
the summary judgment which Watts obtained against Gregory, iln~ 
from which no appeal has been filed, grants to Watts such righ: 
of subrogation/contributiono Watts, by the present judgment 
against PCA, has been unjustly enriched at the hands of PCA £0• 
moneys they personally borrowed, used and received the benefit 
of, Such is not the law, 
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POINT IV 
i'IATTS CANNOT BE RELEASED PROM ANY OBLIGATION 
OTHER THAN ANY DEFICIENCY 
In aenders, Willier & Hart, Vol. 13, p. 69, §13:24(4], 
~ny discharge under subsection (1) of Section 3-606 
is available only "to the extent" that the conduct 
3ffects the accommodation party's obligation. 
The "extent" Gregorys were released on the mortgage 
-.Jt~s was far any deficiency claim. See Exhibit "E" to the 
3et'.'.ement Agreement, which states in part: 
. . PCA . . . releases . . . Gregorys • . . for 
any deficiency which may arise after foreclosure 
of any of the real property which is the subject 
matter of this action. 
PCA hereby acknowledges and consents that they will not 
:o<e any deficiency judgment against Watts after the "foreclosure 
1f . the real property which is the subject matter of this 
PCA did not release any rights of foreclosure, but only 
·r :iny deficie!'lcy. Foreclosure was contemplated and expressly 
::~'.iderl in the Settlement Agreement. Utah law at §70A-3-606 is 
:J.1c1se in that the release is only " .. to the extent •.. " a 
1;•':· is released. 
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POINT V 
THE JOINT OBLIGATIONS STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
DO NOT RELEASE WATTS 
The summary judgment against PCA in favor of w-i~t _ 
§?OA-3-606 and §15-4-1, et. seq. U.C.A., 1953 as amenderl. '" 
15-4-4 provides: 
Subject to the provisions of section 15-4-3, the 
obligee's release or discharge of one or more of 
several obligors, or of one or more of joint or of 
joint and several obliqors, shall not discharge 
co-obligors against whom the obligee in writing 
and as a part of the same transaction as the 
release or discharge expressly reserves his rights: 
and in the absence of such a reservation of rights 
shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent 
provided in section 15-4-5. 
First, PCA expressly reserved its rights against Wac_· 
in writing by the following: 
A. Reservation of the pending litigation, 
B. The terms and provisions of the release of ; 
17, 1981. 
PCA has never dismissed the litigation against either Watts,, 
Gregory, This litigation was of primary importance, was spec 
fically referred to in the release, and was to be "conclude~· 
foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure, and not dismisse--; 
the very terms of the release. 
Second, assuming arguendo that the release is not ' 
express reservation as required by 15-4-4, U.C.A, 19Si ~s 
amended, the release is only to the extent of the prov1s1•'' -
15-4-3 U.C.A., which provides that credit will be given to 
-24-
-c'Jigors if the released obligor is not a surety of the 
~ 1 g,,ics. Watts has consistently argued that they were 
,mm•idat ion makers and hence a surety of Gregory. Gregory has 
;igued an accommodation status and hence is not a surety. 
is ~nd always '1as been willing to give credit to Watts for 
, ''° consideration paid by Gregory. PCA has consistently agreed 
-_: '11ai 1e any deficiency. 
;ssuming, arguendo, that Gregory is a surety of Watts, 
,',en Section 15-4-4, U.C.A. is applicable. Section 15-4-4, 
;,'-~ simply provides the effect of the lack of an express 
"servation releases co-obligors to the extent of 15-4-5, U.C.A. 
3ection 15-4-5 states: 
If an obligee releasing or discharging any obliger 
without express reservation of rights against a 
co-obligor then knows or has reason to know that 
t~e obligor released or discharged did not pay as 
much of the claim as he was bound by his contract 
or relation with that co-oblgor to pay, the obli-
gee's claim against that co-obliger shall be 
satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew or 
had reason to know that the released or discharged 
obliger was bound to such co-obliger to pay. 
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an 
obliger has not then such knowledge or reason to 
know, the obligee's claim against the co-obliger 
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of 
two amounts, namely: (a) the amount of the frac-
tional share of the obliger released or discharged, 
or (b) the amount that such oligor was bound by 
his contract or relation with the co-obligor to 
pay. 
Whether PCA knew or had reason to know of Gregory's 
ion of the obligation is a question of fact. There is no 
lence, affidavit or discovery dealing with this question of 
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"' 
fact. Hence, summary judgment is inappropriate. Howev~r. 
assuming arguendo, that PCA did not know or have reasn11 t 1 
then the second paragraph of 15-4-5 is applicable and PCA ~,,,, 
give credit of the "lesser of two amounts", i.e., the am0 un1 
the fractional share of the released or discharged obligor 
Again PCA has always been willing to do that by waiving any 
deficiency. 
POINT VI 
THE ONLY ISSUE REMAINING IS THE AMOUNT DUE UNDER 
THE NOTES AND PCA IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
The trial court earlier granted PCA a partial summary 
judgment in the following respects: 
A, Defendants Watts have executed the three notes; 
B. The notes are regular on their face; 
C. The notes are genuine; and 
D. A decree of foreclosure on the 481 acre propert·, 
granted, subject only to the ascertainment of t~1e 
amount due on said note. 
E. An issue of fact exists on the amount ,.lue under '' 
notes, and whether the Home/Farm is security for t. 
Notes (R. 251, 332-33). 
The only remaining issue to the granting of PCA's motion toi 
summary judgment is the establishment of the amounts due ther" 
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PCA, by and through Mr. Thad Allen, filed two affidavits, 
i•rst being dated October 9, 1981, wherein the principal and 
,rest has been cletailed to that date, leaving a combined 
.Jlance 'lf $340,610.60, plus a per diem of $149.69 from and after 
,,, gt:1 of October, 1981. Since that date, per an internal audit 
;cro an audit conducted by FCA, there has been an additional 
idjustment of $8, 783. Bl. (See Thad Allen Affidavit of December, 
'de and document # 11) . At the time of the second affidavit of 
:1ad l\llen, December 7, 1981, there remained an unpaid balance of 
$346,346. 72. No counter affidavit has been filed to rebut or put 
11to issue this amount. 
PCA also took the deposition of defendants Watts on the 
2nd of December, 1981 prepatory for its motion for summary judg-
~ent on the only remaining issue. Defendant Milo Watts filed an 
affidavit in November, 1980 about the crop proceeds, in which 
~ilo Watts states that there should be crop proceeds of 
529,969.00. The actual proceeds, together with the adjustments, 
is $46,553.59. When asked about the calculation of the $29,969 
'igure, Milo Watts states at pages 4 and '5 of his deposition: 
Q (by Mr. Brown} Would you tell me, sir, how you 
had arrived at $29,969 figure in your Affidavit? 
A. I didn't arrive at that. 
Q. Who did? 
A. I don't know 
Q. Do you have any knowledge of how much the 
reasonable value of the crops for the 1980 year 
should have been or was? 
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A. I don't think so. 
On page 6, Mr. Watts was asked: 
Q. Now, do you know how much grain was r'liS<><i ,~r 
harvested, I should say? 
A. Jl<o, not exactly. 
At page 6, Mr. Watts admitted: 
Q. As I understand it, there were two crops of 
hay simply because everybody got started late, r 
guess? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you got perhaps 400 bushels of grain 
and perhaps $4,000 worth of seed, is that right? 
A. I think. 
Q. Any other crop that we haven't covered that 
was grown that year? 
In the Affidavit of Mr. Watts, specifically in paraq·,· 
7, ML Watts simply disagrees with the interest calculation o: 
PCA. Yet, when asked about that, at pages 9 and 10 of his depc 
sition, he admits: 
Q, You have not made any independent or separate 
calculation of the interest yourself, have you? 
Q. So you really don't know whether that figute 
is incorrect or correct? 
A. No, I don't. 
Finally, when asked whether Mr. Watts had ever 
an accounting (which PCA asserts was given to himl, Mr. Wit' 
testified: 
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Q. Have you ever inquired of anyone at PCA or any 
nther person what happened to the crops, how they 
were accounted for? 
,'\. No. 
Under these circumstances and by Milo Watts' own admis-
·,oo '1e has no knowledge upon which to refute or even challenge 
1ncontcwerted Affidavits of Thad Allen. 
~rs. Cleown Watts had no knowledge of how much crop was 
:,wn :ir the results from the sale of said crops (pages 8-9 of 
'~:s, Watt.s' deposition). It is therefore apparent that the 
,,,contr::>verted Affidavits of Mr. Thad Allen be and are controlling 
co t'.l the amount due and owing to PCA. 
In the Complaint, paragraph 9 (R. 2), PCA alleged the 
:c·1;ng to PCA a mortgage (Ex. Dl to the Complaint. In paragraph 
·of •'1e Answer of Watts, Watts admits the execution of said 
~crt3age (R. 44). The mortgage covers not only the Gregory Farm, 
,';t 'llso the Home/Farm. 
PCA therefore is entitled to a decree of foreclosure on 
'Dt~ the Gregory Farm and the Home/Farm with a provision that no 
'
0 'lci.ency j'Jdgment may attach in the event the sheriff's sale 
,·co•·Perls are inadequate to pay the costs of sale and PCA in full. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment in favor of Watts against PCA is 
''lrpr,)pr iate for the following reasons and must be reversed: 
A. There is a material issue of fact as to Watts' 
.,~JS as 20-makAr or accommodation maker. 
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B. T'1e pending litigation is an express reser,H;,, 
a claim against watts. 
C. The release of ,July 17, 1981 cont a ins an ,oxpros 
reservation of the claim against Watts. 
D. There was an express oral reservati·Jn of t'·1 ~ r 
against watts, 
E. The extent of the release of July 17, 1981 is fc· 
"no deficiency." 
F. PCA has given credit under §15-4-3, TJ.C.I\. t'l wa:·., 
G. PCA has given full credit to Watts under Jlj-l-\ 
U.C.11.. 
H. If the judgment is not reversed, Watts will ~e 
unjustly enriched by receiving full satisfaction by way 0f 
subrogation/contribution from Gregory while being relieved of,. 
responsibility to PCA. 
Summary judgment and decree of foreclosure shoul~ Je 
granted to PCA against Watts and Gregory, without a right 0f 
deficiency, on the Gregory Farm and the Home/Farm for the 
following reasons: 
A, PCA obtained a partial summary judgment with the 
only issues of how much was due and owing under the no•es an,1 
whether the Home/Farm is under the mortgage. 
B. There is no contravention of the affidavits ot f 
on the amount owing, 
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c. Watts has admitted the execution of the notes and 
·~~g~, w~ich by their terms provide for the relief to PCA of 
rPe of foreclosure on both the Gregory Farm and the Home/Farm. 
Respectfully submitted this the ~day of November, 
• 93 J. 
JARDINE, LINEBAU BROWN & DUNN 
Farm Production 
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